Updated on November 8th after Trump’s victory and Powell’s appointment as UK National Security Adviser.
Russia and her allies are at war with the west, even if the west has not yet understood that it is at war with Russia. This reality signifies a new era in geopolitics. Two pillars of the era that has passed must be transcended. Firstly, the influence of the application of weaponised interdependence as the most that we can do stand up to dictators has been transcended in Ukraine but there is further to go. Secondly, the emphasis on enforcing deals on countries invaded by dictators in the name of peace at any price remains the default position of much of the international community and multilateral organisations like the UN. As Keynes said: “When the facts change I change my mind, what do you do? ” Sanctions and Appeasement have not worked, are not working and will not work.
Ernest Bevin would have understood the threat of weaponised interdependence because he understood supply chains and networks as much as he instinctively grasped the geopolitics of facing the dictators. He was head of the Transport and General Workers Union before he delivered the tools for victory in World War Two and created the postwar system of collective security as Foreign Secretary. He would have also recognised the limitations of this approach to fighting dictators.
The Ukraine war has demonstrated the reality of Weaponised Interdependence and the inadequacy of using it as a response to dictators. This inadequacy was fully demonstrated when Russia launched its full scale invasion and Ukraine’s western allies moved far beyond it as the only possible response. They have not moved far enough, in my opinion, but the idea of sanctions being the only response to the invasion of a sovereign state has disappeared. What has not been abandoned is idea that it is for states invaded by dictators to make compromises and do deals for peace. The Powell Doctrine coexists with the weaponised interdependency doctrine as the alternative to full scale war and possible nuclear annihilation. It is rooted in the mistaken application of rational choice theory to the minds and actions of dictators. It is dangerously misguided. This essay will argue that the weaponising of interdependence as a response to dictators has now been transcended by the West and we are on a journey towards a full military confrontation with Russia but that in contradiction of this development the Powell Doctrine remains firmly in place and will be operationalised when the time is right. Both these things cannot be true if we are to achieve peace: appeasement does not work against dictators.
The Weaponised Interdependence theory (WIT) describes how states leverage their positions within global economic and technological networks to exert power and influence over others. This theory, developed by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, has been instrumental in bringing greater legibility to the dynamics of modern geopolitical conflicts. However, while WIT provides valuable insights into how conflict could be and was managed before the full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, its limitations are increasingly apparent in the current geopolitical landscape. This essay will define WIT and its core principles, analyse its application to the Ukraine war, and critique its limitations, particularly in terms of realpolitik, the resilience of autocratic regimes, and the necessity for direct military support. One of the problems of complexity thinking about geopolitics creates is a paradigm of appeasement: the Powell Paradigm.
Defining Weaponized Interdependence
Weaponized Interdependence is a theory that posits states can exploit their central positions within global networks to exert coercive power over others. Farrell and Newman identify two primary mechanisms through which states can weaponise interdependence: the “Panopticon effect” and the “Chokepoint effect.”
Panopticon Effect: This refers to the ability of states to gather and exploit information through their control over key nodes in global networks. By monitoring financial transactions, communications, and other data flows, states can gain strategic insights and leverage this information for coercive purposes, this has been fully deployed in the hybrid war on Ukraine and in the parallel information war that has been waged on Ukraine since 2014. This information war extends globally and goes beyond fake news to the funding of political parties, for example Jacob Zuma’s MK Party in the recent South African election. The Russian information war is a global conflict.
Chokepoint Effect: This involves the ability to control essential nodes or hubs within global networks, thereby restricting or denying access to critical resources and services. States can use this control to exert pressure on adversaries, disrupt their economies, and influence their political decisions. Paradoxically the application of sanctions as a form of chokepoint on the Russian war economy has had the opposite to the desired effect of isolation. Russia has now developed a supply chain that routes through an alternative global economy encompassing China, Iran, and North Korea with supplies coming from other states outside this immediate axis of dictatorships and through this route western technology continues to arrive in the Russian war machine.
One significant limitation of WIT is the underestimation of the resilience of autocratic regimes. Despite extensive economic sanctions and technological controls, Russia has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt and sustain its war efforts. The centralization of power within autocratic regimes often allows for greater control over resources and the ability to implement countermeasures more swiftly than in democratic systems. This resilience destroys the basis of the efficacy of WIT as a standalone strategy for compelling behavioral change in autocratic states. The use of mercenaries is also a significant feature of Russia’s ability to fight as is the use of autonomous weapons systems. The Russian war economny, for all its corruption and inefficiency, is in a state of balance with production and recruitment keeping up with use and destruction of equipment and human casualties.
The theory of WIT also tends to overlook the significant role played by non-state actors in modern conflicts. In the Ukraine war, various non-state actors, including private military companies, private companies and products like Starlink, cyber groups, and international volunteer networks, have influenced the course of the conflict. These actors operate outside traditional state-centric frameworks and can both support and undermine state strategies. The involvement of non-state actors complicates the application of WIT, as it requires addressing a broader and more diffuse set of challenges.
Perhaps the most critical limitation of WIT in the context of the Ukraine war is the need for direct military support. While economic sanctions and technological controls are essential tools, they are clearly insufficient on their own to ensure Ukraine’s success against Russian aggression. Direct military assistance, including the provision of advanced weaponry, training for Ukrainian forces, and intelligence support, has been crucial for bolstering Ukraine’s defense capabilities and countering Russian advances. This has demonstrated the extent to which the world that WIT described has already passed into history and a new phase of geopolitics has begun in which it is no longer possible to stand on the sidelines and try to influence from afar and through networks but it is necessary to fight the enemy directly.
We are, therefore, standing at a significant inflection point in world history. There is a road to the open deployment of NATO forces in Ukraine against Russia, which is the only way in which Ukraine will be able to win this war outright, and that road, critics argue, has nuclear holocaust at the the end of it. The other road, is a continuation of the status quo which defined the post-Iraq War era. This road, the one in which weaponising interdependence was the primary tool, alongside selective air strikes, and some support for proxy wars, has reached a destination of sorts in the direct supply of equipment, intelligence, training and money to Ukraine to fight Russia.
Trump’s victory means we are back in Powell Paradigm of peace dealing, which is not the same thing as peace making.
The Powell Paradigm was that any deal that stops the fighting is better than any intervention that prolongs the fighting. This worked, to an extent, in Northern Ireland and Colombia.
The typography of the the Powell Doctrine for Conflict Resolution would like something like this:
Comprehensive Approach: Military solutions alone are insufficient for resolving insurgencies. While security measures are essential, they must be coupled with political strategies that address the underlying issues fueling the conflict. Powell is therefore not the direct offspring of the Kissinger Doctrine, there is a more nuanced view of power but one that seems to grasp intra-state conflicts which are resource or political power focussed, and therefore rational on some basis rather than existential. It has never worked in inter-state conflicts involving a super power.
Engagement and Dialogue: Effective conflict resolution requires direct engagement with all relevant parties, including those involved in violence. This engagement, often conducted secretly to avoid public backlash, helps to understand perspectives and seek common ground. Governments must navigate the delicate balance of negotiating without appearing to capitulate to terrorist demands, avoiding the misstep of appeasement while still offering a political pathway. Again real application in intra-state conflicts has been successful but this has not worked in inter-state conflicts: Israel-Palestine for example. That is the point of an existential conflict, it requires the complete destruction of the other side. Germany 1945 but….
Realistic Expectations: Demands for unconditional surrender are unrealistic and counterproductive. Insurgent groups need a narrative that allows them to justify peace to their supporters, avoiding any perception of abject surrender. Preconditions before talks, such as the decommissioning of weapons, often hinder negotiations. Instead, these issues should be addressed within the negotiation process. The logic here is that if your nation state is invaded by another nation state it is unrealistic and counterproductive to expect the United Nations, international law and treaties all of which protect your right to sovereignty and the restoration of your borders, to come to your defence and restore those borders. It would be counter productive in the process of talks if the victim state insists on their rights against the perpetrator state because the bystanders need to progress the process of deal making.
Mutual Stalemate: Both sides must recognize that a military victory is unattainable, fostering a willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations. In Northern Ireland, both the British army and the IRA realized that a purely military solution was impossible, prompting them to seek a political settlement and in many other intra state conflicts this holds true and indeed, that is how it looked for many by the end of Battle of Britain before the US entered the war: hence the Hess mission to Scotland. The problem with the mutual stalemate model is that it is applied to binary conflicts. The Russian war on Ukraine is not necessarily and should not be legally a binary conflict. Actually, the United Nations had a legal responsibility to defend a member state against the crimes of aggression. The categories of conflict are therefore different, other states could have, and still can, enter the war on the side of the victim state against the aggressor and it would be perfectly legal for them to do so. Indeed, the level of support given by NATO to date means that they are de facto in this war and are therefore parties to this conflict. It is a stalemate, in so far as it is a stalemate, only because the parties to the conflict that support Ukraine have been limited in the support that they have offered. This is not a stasis determined by a balance of power, it is a statis determined by policy choices. Different and arguably better choices for the future of Europe could be made.
Risk-Taking Leadership: Political leaders must be willing to take significant risks for peace, demonstrating commitment and creating momentum. The Northern Ireland peace process saw leaders like Tony Blair, Bertie Ahern, and John Hume take substantial personal and political risks to achieve peace. Indeed, but political leaders should also be prepared to take greater risks to oppose dictators and fight wars that prevent them from ever invading another sovereign nation again.
Continuous Process: Establishing and maintaining a continuous peace process is crucial. Interruptions can lead to renewed violence, making it essential to keep parties engaged and hopeful. The peace process must be dynamic, adapting to new challenges and maintaining momentum through what can be termed the “bicycle theory” – once the process is moving, it must not be allowed to stall. What this means in practice, or has meant, is massive pressure on the victims states to compromise with perpetrator states, as at Dayton, on their sovereignty, rights, reparations, the right to return in exchange for the end of fighting. As Armenia has learned over many years the peace process can actually be simply the rearmament pause. When Azerbaijan was strong enough it simply went back to war. Moldova and Georgia faced the same dilemma when Russia invaded them. Ukraine sits at that impasse today.
Third-Party Facilitation: Neutral third parties play a crucial role in mediating negotiations and building trust among conflicting groups. Their involvement can provide an impartial perspective and help bridge gaps between the parties. This is highly applicable to intra-state conflicts but the idea of peace clubs of states that work with both sides to advance peace in Ukraine is deeply implausible given the Russian record of lies, deceit and hybrid warfare. Should it be tried in the Russian war on Ukraine, of course. Will it work: not a chance except as the acceptable fig leaf needed to impose an unjust peace on Ukraine.
Inclusive Outcomes: For a settlement to be lasting, it must avoid the zero-sum mentality where one side’s gain is seen as the other’s loss. Agreements should be designed so that all parties feel they have achieved something, fostering a sense of shared victory and mutual benefit. Which entirely rewards the perpetrator and punishes the victim state.
Optimism in Resolution: Finally, it is crucial to maintain that all conflicts, no matter how prolonged or bloody, can be resolved with the right conditions, patience, and leadership. The lessons from Northern Ireland show that even seemingly intractable conflicts can find resolution through sustained and dedicated efforts. Or perhaps by the defeat of the aggressor, their prosecution or the break-up of the Empire they are seeking to expand and the creation of a new democratic and accountable order.
The current geopolitical landscape underscores the inadequacy of relying solely on Weaponized Interdependence (WIT) and sanctions to counter the aggression of autocratic regimes like Russia. While WIT provided a framework for understanding and managing conflicts through economic and technological networks, the resilience of autocracies and the complexities introduced by non-state actors necessitate a more direct and robust approach. The limitations of WIT have become evident in the Russian war on Ukraine, where the need for direct military support has proven essential. As we navigate this inflection point in history, it becomes clear that appeasement and limited interventions are insufficient. True peace requires decisive action and the willingness to confront aggressors directly. The Powell Paradigm, advocating for negotiated compromises and minimal conflict, fails in the face of existential threats posed by dictatorships. To achieve lasting peace, the international community must transcend these outdated doctrines and commit to a strategy that includes both comprehensive military support and unwavering opposition to dictatorial expansionism.
The Charlwood Review Books 