Issues in Post-War Democratic Transition in Ukraine

Introduction

There is a potential political trajectory of Ukraine that has the potential to see the country’s electoral landscape dominated by popularism. Such a development could mirror situations like those in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey where elections persist, but the scope of broader freedoms is narrowed by dominance of populist leaders and that this could result in a back peddling on EU membership which would in turn question NATO membership. In wartime opening spaces in which the current political direction can be discussed is challenging but not impossible. It is essential that this process begins now. Any such process will be designed and based on the realities of Ukrainian politics and society. This brief paper assembles relevant examples from various external contexts. It examines instances where constitutional, reconciliation, and consensus-building processes occurred. Additionally, it looks at socio-economic reform processes that were triggered by war and the contrasting processes for seeking reparations and justices. These reforms and processes can serve as catalysts for democratic consolidation but there are also dangers that failure to address social cohesion through construction of an equitable post-war settlement and failed attempts at seeking reparations and justice for crimes against the people of Ukraine can deepen populist tendencies and encourage grievance-based politics. In the absence an elite bargain or a coalition government, there need to be processes developed to counter the growth of populism in the structures of the transition from war to peace.
These processes to be entirely organic and spring from the Ukrainian context, traditions, and political realities. The cases studies presented here are therefore designed as illustrative of other processes that developed in other contexts and not as blueprints of best practice to be imported. They are meant to be useful in process design terms as examples that have features that may be drawn on in the creation of the Ukrainian process.
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia has transformed many aspects of Ukrainian society. That transformation has produced countervailing forces with respect to Ukraine’s future democratic development. On the one hand the invasion has propelled Ukraine out of the Russian orbit forever. Russia has been working to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty since 1991, the full-scale invasion is therefore the culmination of a long war on Ukrainian independence. Western aid in the defence of Ukraine should have pulled Ukraine ever further west. However, the ambiguity of the NATO membership process and the complex nature of socio-economic reform necessary for EU membership have muddied the water. The level of western military aid, which has been immense, can also be characterised as enough support to ensure Ukraine is not defeated but not enough to ensure victory, for example in terms of air cover. This has pushed Ukraine inwards. In Ukraine, there’s a rising sentiment favouring a self-reliant future. This perspective is grounded in essentialist nationalism, which, considering the extent of Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion, is not without justification.
This essentialist nationalist narrative is a powerful weapon in the context of resistance, self-preservation, and victory. In the transition to peace through that victory or a compromise peace, it can result in a very particular form of “democratic” trajectory reminiscent of the current Turkish or Hungarian governments and others. It should not be surprising that an essentialist nationalism has emerged from this war.
Essentialist nationalism is a perspective on nationalism that holds that nations have an inherent and unchanging essence that makes them distinct. This essence is typically seen as based on shared characteristics such as language, religion, customary practices, conceptions of social capital, and shared history which is often a shared view of an imagined past. The concept of essentialist nationalism dates to the Romantic period in Europe when thinkers emphasized the unique spirit and identity of a people, often rooted in an imagined shared past. Johann Gottfried Herder, for instance, highlighted the unique “soul” of each nation, arguing that it had developed organically through history and established the significance of language and thought so by extension language and identify communities. Proponents of essentialist or romantic nationalism argue that the shared experiences and collective memories of past events create a common thread that binds members of a nation especially as it is expressed and understood through a common language. A shared language is seen as fundamental to national identity, reflecting common ways of thinking about the past and thereby, in a romantic Weltanschauung way of perceiving the world. A shared religious belief can be a strong unifier, providing both shared moral direction/code and a sense of collective purpose. A deep connection to a specific land or territory can be seen as part of a nation’s essence. All these elements have been long present in the narrative of Ukrainian nationalism.
The full-scale invasion produced a mainstreaming of Ukrainian essentialist nationalism and mobilisation for war produced institutional support for it. For example, in the universalism of Ukrainian language and the expulsion of the Russian Orthodox church. Moreover, this kind of nationalism is perhaps a necessary element of a war effort providing a shared identity that has contributed to a strong sense of unity underpinning the extraordinary resistance Ukraine has offered to the invasion by its much bigger neighbour. Within this essentialism there have also been more complex currents, for example stressing the diversity of Ukrainian society and embracing Crimean Tartars and IDPs from the East. This strain of constructivist nationalism acknowledges that national identities are malleable and shaped by political, social, and historical factors. In the Ukrainian context, and in wartime, even these nationalist expressions have elements of essentialism in them. President Zelensky is highly skilled at navigating a course between an essentialist nationalism at home and a constructivist nationalism abroad.
Embracing the idea of constructivist nationalism and pluralism in the post-war development of Ukraine requires social cohesion based on a simple to state but difficult to achieve idea of fair shares for all. If we the people have shared in full the sacrifices of war, then we the people should share fairly in the dividends of peace. This idea formed the basis of the post-war consensus in the UK and across Western Europe and Scandinavia. These regions implemented variations of social democrat and Rhine based models of capitalism. These models pursued full employment, welfare states, social housing, and public health provision, with differing models of financing these objectives but with a common goal of social cohesion. The UK is presented as a Case Study here because it was on the winning side in the war, the only state to have fought Nazi Germany throughout and because this “consensus” was forged as an elite bargain early in the war when the coalition government was formed. Other European social settlements had more or less emphasis on public ownership and higher or lower proportions of welfare provided from direct taxation compared to social insurance but the models were, until the 1980s, similar. The UK, and by implication the other European models, are contrasted with the approach taken historically in the US to land distribution through the Home Stead Act and during and after World War two with the GI Bill. This freer market or Atlantic capitalist approach also had a strong emphasis on fairness, but this was much more narrowly transactional than the Social Democratic model. To qualify for fair shares in the US you had to have served in the military, the principle of the UK consensus was that welfare was universal. A major split occurred in the post-1945 Labour government when the Chancellor Hugh Gaitskell imposed the first charges on teeth and glasses in the Budget of 1950 – ending the principle of free at the point of use universalism in health provision almost as soon as it was launched.
The debates on post-war recovery were marked by a broad consensus on the need for state intervention and planning to avoid the problems of the interwar years but this was not the same as ideological unity. The Labour Party’s victory in 1945 can be seen as a public mandate for its vision of post-war Britain, leading to the establishment of the welfare state and the nationalization of key industries. The Conservative Party did the deal that was necessary to win the war, but the two parties were like two trains leaving the same station at the same time on parallel tracks with entirely different destinations.
The interconnection between the social cohesion of fairness in post-war recovery, the domestic politics of extracting reparations from perpetrators, and the pursuit of justice provides the raw material for a process that can act as a counter to populism. It can be summed up as the construction of the post-war social settlement rooted in social cohesion that could produce a new social contract.
Populism thrives on perceived injustices, socio-economic disparities, and a sense of disenfranchisement among significant portions of the population: in Hirschman’s construction, put crudely, the absence of voice destroys loyalty and leads to an exit from democracy. The wartime consensus in the UK, Case Study 1, aligned state-led interventions with public sentiments to reassure that the exclusion which followed the return to normalcy after World War One would not be repeated. The public mandate given to the Labour Party was not just a call for economic recovery but also a profound desire for inclusive nation-building. The Scottish Constitutional Convention, similarly, accentuates the importance of inclusive, consensus-driven approaches in ensuring wide-ranging societal representation and preventing divisive populism. But the other takeaways from Case Study 1 and Case Study 3 should also influence political strategy. The elite bargain that formed the UK’s war time coalition and injected post-war social and economic fair shares into the war aims was an entirely conditional consensus on what was needed to win the war. It did not survive the 1945 General Election campaign which took place before the war in the Far East was even over. The inclusive nature of the Scottish Constitutional Convention (Case Study 3) built consensus whilst excluding two political parties entirely – the Conservatives from the outset and the SNP exiting during the process when full independence was ruled out. The Convention worked because the sense of disenfranchisement in Scotland was in relation to the dominance of the Westminster politics by Thatcher’s Conservatives and the decentralisation of the political discussion, leading to a devolution of power, allowed an outlet through democratic change rather than an outlet through populism for this profound disillusionment.
For Ukraine, the policies outlined in Case Study 2, the Homestead Act and the GI Bill could serve dual purposes. While primarily aiming for free market means of economic and agricultural rejuvenation – transferring land ownership rather than nationalising land and offering cheap mortgages for private purchase rather than social housing – they also create citizens with a stakes in stability through the ownership of property.
Shifting from domestic policies the remaining case studies (4-7) consider the implications of victory beyond military success. The context will determine almost everything in the playing out of the politics of victory. If that victory is partial, based on a compromise peace and imposed by the international community then the prospect for derailing a populist outcome in Ukraine are heavily reduced. A social settlement based on fair shares is perhaps the only way to avoid a populist tilt in the event of an imposed compromise peace. But even if a sovereignty-based victory is achieved the reparations and justice processes, (Case Studies 6 and 7) as illustrated by France’s interwar experiences, can still be drivers for destabilisation. The perceived injustices surrounding reparations and the economic hardships faced by ‘victorious’ nations can become fertile grounds for populist narratives. Ukraine, therefore, must tread carefully in its pursuit of reparations, ensuring that the process does not exacerbate internal divisions or become a populist rallying cry. Lessons from the TRC process (Case Study 4) and other processes that developed after South Africa (Case Study 6) should be actively considered.
However, the quest for a just peace in Ukraine faces daunting challenges, particularly in the realm of international law. (Case Study 7) While legal avenues, such as the Crime of Aggression and proposed international tribunal, provide potential pathways for justice, they are fraught with geopolitical complexities. There is also a strong tendency in the international human rights industry to grandstand and over promise what legal processes might deliver. Ukraine’s challenge, therefore, is to strike a balance between seeking justice and ensuring domestic stability. Overemphasis on international legal confrontations, especially if they do not yield tangible results, might fuel populist sentiments of ‘betrayal.’ If this occurs in the context of an imposed compromise peace the prospects for democracy in Ukraine will look bleak.
In conclusion, as Ukraine embarks on its post-conflict journey, the lessons from historical precedents are clear. While the path to reconciliation and recovery is crucial, the need to be build a political economy based on social cohesion as a counter to populism is also clear. Strategies that promote inclusivity, economic well-being, and a sense of cosmopolitan national unity will be Ukraine’s most potent tools in this endeavour. The international community, in turn, must recognize its role in supporting Ukraine not just in its pursuit of justice, but in its aspiration for a cohesive, stable, and truly democratic construction of its future.

The full text and the cases studies can be reviewed in the document below: