

Assessment Report

December 2016

AKTIS
STRATEGY

SSR, Oversight and Accountability Capacity Building to Support GoI SSR Efforts in Iraq



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1. Executive Summary

In October 2016 the United Nations Development Programme retained Aktis Strategy to support its activities on SSR in Iraq. As a first step towards delivering training to two committees, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Committee and the Security and Defence Committee (SDC), we deployed a team of experts to meet with and assess the capacity gaps in both committees. We summarise below the findings from our assessment mission, and provide a full update in the main body of the report.

The balance of the evidence examined during the assessment phase is that the following needs to be addressed:

- 1) The SDC does not have a methodology based on risk analysis or policy / legislative cycles for prioritising the focus of its hearings for either oversight or legislative support purposes
- 2) The staff of the SDC might well be competent at this moment but they do change with elections and with the composition of the committee so institutional memory and relationships with agencies and with CSOs are variable.
- 3) Co-ordination within the security sector is weak because of multiple agencies and this means that while there are good bilateral relationships between the SDC and some parts of the security sector, there is no structural engagement between the two.
- 4) The SSR Committee has developed a high-level organisational strategy for reform which needs to be fleshed out with operational detail, modelled to see how it can be implemented and focussed on achievable objectives in an early phase to build support from other stakeholders so that the overall strategy is owned by key stakeholders.
- 5) There is an acceptance that the SSR plan's success or failure will depend upon Committee members' ability to be highly selective and iterative in their implementation of the strategy through identifying those activities upon which there is alignment of political interest, executive will, and low cost.
- 6) There is an acceptance in key elements of the security sector that the sector suffers from duplication, overlapping mandates across institutions and corruption, and that reform is needed to reflect economic reality but that the process is blocked by political reality. The assessment has mapped out bilateral relationships across the branches of government that might be worked on to move forward small pieces of administrative and process based reforms that will build confidence in the overall process.

Within both committees, institutional and technical capability is weak or, at best, variable. Overlaying this is a varied perception and (at times) undue confidence amongst members of both committees in their skills. This, at times, results in **dissonance between training needs and institutional / individual appetite to upskill and reform**, explored further in the main body of our report.

An attempt to address these weaknesses requires a long-term investment in training and mentoring in those areas outlined below, working together on **creating demand** by committee members for training and development, and **providing supply** and access to such mentoring and training.

2. Introduction

In October 2016 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) retained Aktis Strategy (Aktis) to plan and implement capacity building support to the Government of Iraq (GoI)'s security sector reform efforts.

This project supports the UNDP's Phase II Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), comprising three objectives: to assist the GoI to finalize the draft National Security Strategy and developed GoI SSR plan; support the Iraqi parliament, specifically the Security and Defence Committee (SDC) to improve oversight; and engage with civil society to raise awareness and to encourage buy-in and public support for the GoI efforts in SSR.

In November 2016 our team carried out a document review of UNDP records and interviews with SDC and SSR Committee members to inform our capacity needs assessment of both committees. This report outlines our key findings and recommendations, including immediate and long term capacity building plan / matrix, and forms the basis for subsequent training to the SSR Committee on immediate capacity building needs in relation to the SSR plan development process and the SDC on accountability and oversight of SSR.

2.1. Background

The challenge of reforming the security structure in Iraq is acute: there is not political consensus on the way forward and little alignment between political interest, parliamentary process, and executive will.

The military operation against Daesh requires a high level of intelligence capacity and vigilance. The ability of Da'esh to break out and attack means that the different agencies are on high alert. The multiplicity of agencies and the duplication and competition that follows is a source of inefficiency, friction and even direct conflict. This repetition reflects the political reality that all the main interests in Iraq feel that they must maintain at times duplicative security and intelligence capacities, and that the Iraqi state should pay for it.

However, the economic reality is that once the immediate military operations have been concluded and in the absence of donors filling the gap, there will have to be substantial re-structuring of the security sector. This will involve creating a coherent plan for Iraq's security sector, placing the security apparatus and various intelligence agencies on a legal and legitimate basis, and having clear civilian oversight of their operations and processes.

2.1.1. Parliamentary Oversight

The GoI is currently balancing two imperatives: the need to rebuild and enhance capacity in central Government institutions (which experienced a wholesale turnover following the ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003) whilst countering the violent Da'esh insurgency which continues to control large parts of the country.

The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR), which began its third term in 2014, is a young institution and its legislative, oversight, and citizen outreach abilities are still being developed. Key CoR committees with remit over the security sector—principally the Security and Defence Committee (SDC), but also the Women’s, Human Rights, and Finance committees—lack the relevant knowledge and capacity on issues of oversight and accountability of security and of SSR.

This capacity gap was rendered more acute by former Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki’s centralisation of Iraq’s security sector under the executive. This action limited parliamentary, judicial and civilian oversight over Iraq’s national security apparatus.


External to parliament, Iraq’s nascent civil society is still developing its role and contribution to oversight and accountability in the security sector. The principal challenge faced by civil society is its relative youth as a sector: Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and their members are still learning how to express themselves openly and require support to channel their voice effectively.

2.1.2. Reforming the Security Sector

Iraq’s security sector remains highly fragmented, duplicative and politically affiliated; this complicates efforts to agree on a broad strategic approach towards the security architecture and to enhance the system’s administrative and organisational capacity, its effectiveness and accountability.

The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) is currently leading efforts to develop a national SSR Plan to support and feed into the GoI’s broader development of a National Security Strategy (NSS). With a second iteration of the plan now being edited and developed, the important next step is to look towards implementing such a plan.

Implementation requires alignment in institutional interest, capacity and political will, all of which diverge across the relevant actors. That said, the SSR Committee is limited in its capacity, represents a broad range of interests, and operates in a highly politicised space. Three layers of complexity operate: internal, external and political.



While there is a clear consensus that SSR is necessary and inevitable because of economic reality, there is no “consensus” on what SSR should look like and how to get there.

2.2. Methodology

In November 2016 our team carried out interviews with SDC and SSR Committee members to inform this capacity needs assessment. Amongst others, our team interviewed:

- MP Hakim al-Zamili, member of the Ahrar block and Chair of the SDC;
- MP Nayyef al-Shimmery, member of the National Alliance, Deputy Chair of the SDC;
- MPs Iskandar WitWit, Hamid al-Mutlaq and Shakhwan Abdullah, members of the SDC;
- Hamza Sharif, Director General, Al-Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS);
- Dr. Noha Daweesh, NGO programme officer at ANCSS;
- Major-General Hadi al-Maliqi, strategic planning department at the National Security Service;
- Dr. Maytham Tameem Hussein Mohammad, Director, Directorate of Defence Planning, Ministry of Defence;
- Major-General Ala' Hussein Ali, Head of Planning, Ministry of Interior;
- Major-General Naseer Mutr, Federal Intelligence & Investigation Agency, Ministry of Interior;
- Ammar al-Taie, Programme Officer, Rule of Law, UNDP Iraq;
- Bill Dechow, Senior SSR Advisor, Rule of Law, UNDP Iraq; and,
- Chamila Hemmathagama, Programme Manager, Rule of Law, UNDP Iraq.

The team asked a series of open and closed questions with the objective to i) identify perceived training needs by committee members; ii) identify the institutional and organizational priorities within organizations and amongst committee members to situate our analysis in a sound understanding of the context; and, iii) understand the challenges faced to date to implementing change and within the work carried out by committees.

The team also conducted a thorough document review in support of our analysis, including:

- SDC's Rules of Procedure of the Iraqi Council of Representatives.
- National Security Council Order 5/1/1532, 27 August 2015.
- UNDP, Capacity Assessment Report 'Workshop on Parliamentary Oversight of Security Sector, Istanbul', 27-28 November 2013.
- Civilian Oversight Action Plans'
- UNDP workshop report: 'Strengthening Democratic Governance & Oversight of the Security Sector Reform', 26-29 March 2016.
- UNDP workshop report: 'Civil Society Role in National Security Sector Reform', 10 March 2016.
- UNDP workshop report: 'The role of the Parliamentary Security & Defence Committee and Civil Society on Security Sector Reform in Iraq', 13-14 December 2015.

3. The Security & Defence Committee

As per the CoR Rules of Procedure, the SDC was set up to “enact and review laws, contribute to policy and institutions development processes and oversees the security sector in Iraq while representing the citizens and promoting and protecting their basic human rights.” It is led by Hakim al-Zamily, a Sadrist MP and comprises members selected on an ethno-sectarian quota basis.

Our team assessed the extent to which the SDC is fulfilling its function as an oversight body, measured against the four core functions of parliamentary oversight committees, their areas of weakness as perceived by members of the SDC and other stakeholders involved in the broader process.

3.1. Scope & Effectiveness

Judged against parliamentary committees’ four primary strands of operations, the SDC is making the most progress against the former two and less progress against the last two criteria:

Oversight of the legality of operations

Oversight of effectiveness of operations

Oversight of administrative practices

Oversight of financial management

3.1.1. Oversight of the legality of operations and policy

In the absence of a developed legislative body against which to hold the Iraqi security structures to account, the SDC has been unable to meaningfully evaluate whether existing policies and all aspects of ongoing security operations comply with national law and international standards.

Rather, the SDC has been active in developing laws and clearing the legislative bottleneck affecting the security sector since 2006. The committee, for example, recently passed laws pertaining to the MoI, CTS and Hish’d el-Shabi (PMU), placing the CTS (which previously existing by executive decree) on a statutory footing, and bringing PMUs under the aegis of the state.

3.1.2. Oversight of effectiveness of operations

In relation to monitoring the effectiveness of security operations, we have seen limited evidence of—or interest in—a pro-active attempt to understand the way that security agencies work, their strategies and priorities in an effort to determine whether the agencies are effectively performing their functions, activities and tasks in accordance with the law and the executive’s policies and priorities.

Instead, the SDC has adopted a reactive stance, and has launched investigations into highly politicised events in Iraq’s recent history; al-Zamily lead an investigation into Da’esh’s takeover of Mosul, which implicated prominent Iraqi politicians, including former PM Nouri al-Maliki, and instigated an investigation into the Kerrada bombing (which resulted in around 200 dead), producing a report into failures by the security apparatuses of state and in command and control.

3.1.3. Oversight of administrative practices

The SDC's disinterest in formally linking into the various security actors in the state has affected its interest in and ability to monitor security services' administrative practices. Any effective oversight of administrative practices in this sector is also likely to be highly politicised in view of the great degree of duplication in existence and rumours of tens of thousands of ghost workers.

3.1.4. Oversight of financial management

The SDC has displayed some interest in monitoring security services' internal financial activities including their budgeting and expenditures and described itself as in the middle of a review into the MoD's budget.

3.2. Weaknesses

Stakeholders identified key capacity gaps in the staff and members of the SDC with respect to knowledge of intelligence processes, administrative and managerial process and the methodology of enquiries. The SDC's key weaknesses appear to be: poorly-defined work processes, limited capacity to engage and politicised prioritisation. While all three factors are interlinked, as politicisation is outside donor control, the below section expands on the two factors that may be affected by capacity building efforts.



- **Poorly defined work processes:** SDC members were unable to describe a clear method for prioritising its activities, investigations or approach to its work. Its investigations have been reactionary and in response to public outcry. The SDC's nascent structure and lack of a formalised approach to the conduct of investigations has arguably limited the investigations' rigour; with the SDC operating as a police patrol, while investigations are perceived as politically motivated.

The SDC also lacks a formal approach to proactively liaising with security actors, preferring to operate through directly calling individuals on their mobile phones and consulting security actors when directly relevant to an activity in hand. This arguably hinders their ability to affect meaningful oversight of organisations' effectiveness of operations. Finally, while they appear to be pass on the outcome of enquiries to the judiciary, there is little evidence of judicial follow-up of investigations; while this is in part attributable to political roadblocks, formal linkages with ministries and with the judiciary are absent.

- **Limited technical capacity:** A number of stakeholders expressed the view that SDC was poorly institutionalised and not an effective player on the security scene. SDC's 11 staff are not specialists and rotate based on their connections to serving MPs, leaving limited technical capacity to support the SDC's work.

If the SDC is to perform a more wide ranging role in civilian oversight it will need a permanent secretariat that can be a repository of knowledge, expertise and memory. The SDC tends to function in response to fire alarms in a politicised way and is perceived by some to be anti the security agencies.

3.3. Vision & Training Needs

3.3.1. Vision for the Future

Over the coming months, al-Zamily described his priority as revising the MoD and Weapons laws, and as reforming the Iraqi intelligence sector. To that end, al-Zamily wishes to propose an Intelligence Law which distances the country's seven intelligence agencies from their political masters and unites them under a Ministry of Intelligence-like entity with legal remit and oversight. He would like our help showing international best practice to explain the options of how we might create a single intelligence agency uniting the rest.

3.3.2. Training Needs

Key stakeholders identified capacity gaps in the processes and staff of the SDC committee with respect to prioritisation, knowledge of intelligence processes, administrative and managerial process and the methodology of enquiries.

In turn, that a specific committee will be appointed to oversee the implementation of the SSR plan reporting to the NSC clearly implies that the Executive has identified the ability to implement the reform as the key gap in the capacity of the Iraqi state. As such, a central training need is to develop mechanisms, processes and methodologies to support and then measure the implementation of the reform package by the relevant line ministers. The SDC committee needs to focus on hearings involving international expert witnesses on the different models and approaches outlined to civilian oversight and parliamentary support for SSR processes to embed this knowledge and improve its processes.

Of the two styles of operation for oversight committees: 'fire alarm oversight' (reactive) and 'police patrol oversight' (proactive), the SDC's activities are indicative of 'fire alarm oversight'. This describes oversight that is largely reactive, relying on news stories or potential media coverage, citizens and interest group demands for action to determine when to examine a problem. Police patrol oversight, conversely, is centralised, active and direct; this does not wait for someone to raise the alarm but is more pro-active. It also performs regular functions of oversight and reporting and might well have well established routines – i.e. processes of review and accountability. Themes such as transparency, encouraging adherence to human rights and documenting violations, financial accountability, report writing, and critical thinking need to be developed within the context of moving the committee towards a police patrol functioning.

For now, some areas of capacity weakness appear to be too heavily politicised to have scope for immediate training or capacity building and the initial challenges of gaining acceptance of and legislative support for the reform programme seems much more pressing, alongside technical assistance to the working practices of the committee. The comparison between expert oversight and

parliamentary oversight in the area would allow the SDC to consider their own best approach. The SDC participants will be asked to consider why oversight bodies need financial and human resources? They can consider responses such as:

- Hiring permanent staff that do the day to day work of oversight bodies provides continuity of activities, expertise and 'institutional memory,' despite the fact that members of parliamentary / oversight bodies may change.
- Parliamentary oversight bodies usually hire those already employed by Parliament, whilst expert bodies usually hire from outside government. For both, security clearances for staffers are critical to ensure they are able to handle sensitive information.
- Technical experts are often needed to assist oversight bodies to help them deal with complex issues – often including intelligence, IT and telecommunications experts.

The SDC team can reconsider and perhaps redesign their own working practices. The SDC should discuss implementing joint work plans developed with UNDP to improve coordination on security sector oversight. To do so effectively, CSOs and Parliament need sight of the GOI's SSR strategy to determine where each can play a role. A potential area for collaboration could be annual/semi-annual joint Parliament-civil society reports on progress. For example, CSOs did not have sight of the SDC's investigation into government failures resulting in Da'esh's takeover of Mosul.

Relations between Parliament and civil society are currently limited, and the SDC does not involve CSOs in their work. This is further complicated by the SDC Chair MP Hakim Zamili's links to Shi'a militias. The Human Rights Committee, on the contrary, coordinates well with civil society and there is a well-functioning civil society committee. Dr. Darweesh thought emphasising civil society as close to the Iraqi "street" would improve politicians' outreach to CSOs as they head into the planned 2017 elections and seek votes. Study centres and media campaigns, including a more strategic use of social media, may also increase civil society's relevance to stakeholders in both Parliament and the security sector. Finally, in view of the long term need to rationalise the security and intelligence sector in the state, the SDC will inevitably require to become more versed in oversight of administrative and financial management practices.

The matrix below describes those activities necessary in the short and mid-term to enhance the SDC's effectiveness, their interest and a description of need. This aims to identify areas of cross-over between their interest, needs, and our ability to make impact:

Activity and / or training	SDC Interest	Need	Short / mid / long term priority
Building legislative and political support for achievable reform programme	Medium	High	Short
Reforming the Security Sector of Iraq and creating an overarching institution	High	Medium	Long
Exploring and defining operational mandates	Low	High	Medium
Developing and applying methodology for prioritizing agenda	Medium	High	Short
Improving internal management practices, administration	Medium	High	Medium
Designing HR strategy for expert staff support	Low	High	Long

Developing and maintaining network of contacts and stakeholders in security sector	Medium	High	Medium
Building and extending networks with civil society	Medium	Medium	Medium

3.4. Approach to training

Two broad themes emerged from the meetings with stakeholders: the extent to which either committee had the capacity to assist with the implementation and monitoring of the reform process in technical areas like administration, relevant expertise, management and process; whether or not the political will existed to reform the sector in a way that was commensurate with both economic and political reality.

A number of key stakeholders and the UNDP have asked for comparative analysis of how this process was managed elsewhere. Given the small scale of this project, there is a need to find a golden thread to weave through the delivery and to which both committees and other stakeholders can contribute. This could be done by framing the overall question in such a way as it addressed directly the gaps in knowledge and experience of the two committees:

- Is what is required to move forward with assisting the SSR process a committee that is based in Parliament and can promote and support the legislation needed to achieve the reform strategy or a committee of experts that could shape the implementation plan for the SSR and then work with Parliament and the Executive to achieve the legal framework to implement the reforms.
- Or does Iraq need both?

Given the two relatively short training programmes that are envisioned and given the many potential targets that might be aimed at to support work in this area, Aktis propose that we focus tightly in the training provided for both committees on international comparisons for the architecture of civilian oversight and on models for effective implementations of reform programmes. These two aspects will address the gaps identified in the scoping exercise.

For the SDC we will work in the format of a formal hearing on the question suggested above. Prior to the formal hearings there will be a training session on the conduct of hearings and, given the challenge of logistics, much of the interviewing of witnesses will need to be done by skype.

The exam question for the SDC team: Does the GOI need a committee of experts, and if so, what should be in its mandate, its staffing and its role in implementation or does the GOI needs an effective parliamentary committee, and if so what should be its role in oversight, supporting implementation and financial accountability.

The answer will of course will be that GOI needs both but the process of getting there and the presentations of comparisons will allow us to map what the functions and reporting lines of each should be, what technical support they will need and hopefully encourage them to define and deliver on their mandates. The outcome and logic might also suggest a less political and more technical and strengthened and somewhat professionalised SDC take on the full parliamentary committee role.

4. Security Sector Reform Committee

The SSR Committee was set up in 2015 by Order of the National Security Council (Order 5/1/1532) to establish a national team chaired by the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) and to develop the SSR Plan. This Committee is chaired by the National SSR Coordinator, Hamza Sharif (Sharif), and aims to feed into the GoI's broader development of a National Security Strategy.

The SSR Committee is empowered to develop and then implement an approved SSR Plan covering:

- Restructuring the national security and intelligence organograms and providing them with a legal basis in order to ensure non-overlap, definition of duties and responsibilities, and joint cooperation and coordination;
- Increase readiness of the security sector to make it able to respond to threats, terminate or at least mitigate their risks as well as developing a system for gauging readiness;
- Provision of better security services;
- DDR of former fighters; and,
- Governance of the sector under oversight, supervision and accountability according to practices of democratic countries.

The Committee represents actors from across Iraq's security sector and comprises a series of sub-committees, set up to meet periodically, discuss gaps in the strategy, areas of improvement and make recommendations on those areas relevant to their particular area of expertise. Once the Plan is agreed, the Prime Minister will appoint a committee to oversee the implementation process, reporting to the NSC. The new team will need training support to carry out this work.

Our team met with SSR Committee members to discuss the challenges they have experienced in developing the plan to date, their areas of weakness and training needs as relates to the development and implementation of the SSR Plan.

4.1. Scope & Effectiveness

The SSR Committee operates in a highly-charged political context involving a wide range of Iraqi and international actors and is therefore affected by internal and external factors. Attempts to evaluate its capacity in isolation to this context are therefore undesirable and would limit the effectiveness of future capacity building interventions.

Our assessment of the SSR Committee's work to formulate a plan has identified four overlapping and mutually-reinforcing areas of weakness:

Political Will

Lack of Donor Coordination

A Technocratic Approach to SSR

Varied expertise & Technical Capacity

4.1.1. Political Will

The SSR Committee is currently engaged with completing the drafting of the SSR Plan, which we understand to be going through its third iteration. This follows efforts by Sharif in April 2016 to invigorate the process through tabling a first iteration of the Plan and adopting a top-down approach from the National Security Council (NSC), chaired by Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to energise the committee and sub-committees.

The first draft drew the strongest opposition and push-back from Dr Kadhim at the Ministry of Planning. After an Erbil workshop involving the MoP and in which ten thematic areas for reform were identified (including human resources, reporting, financial reform, amongst others), the Committee is now considering the third draft.

The third iteration of the plan is due to be completed in early December and circulated for comments that month. We understand the Plan to currently be sat with line ministries for comment; after these are incorporated, the Plan needs to be approved by the National Security Council (NSC) and will then be sent back for ministries to implement. Sharif aims to secure approval from the NSC before his retirement on 16 February 2017.

While the SSR planning process has gained momentum in recent months, efforts to agree on direction for reform have not been equally successful across all lines of effort; for example, justice reform has been enthusiastically received by the Iraqi establishment, while intelligence reform has stalled.

That said, there is a rising consensus among security sector stakeholders that long-term reform, including re-structuring the ISF will become a significant priority following the current military campaign to liberate remaining Iraqi territory from Da'esh; this added to pressures facing the state as a result of oil price drops which has required the GoI to more seriously consider government reforms.

4.1.2. Lack of donor coordination affecting the coherence of an approach towards SSR

Parallel to these efforts aiming to build consensus on a vision for the security sector and centralise an approach towards SSR, the MoD, National Security Service and MoI are each developing organisational strategies working with different international actors. These include the UNDP, NATO, OSC-I and a team of Canadian advisors working with different partners to introduce long-term planning and reform structures. We have seen no clear evidence that these parallel efforts to develop institutional-level plans will support efforts to create overall structural coherence. This is exacerbated by reports of varied levels of engagement in the SSR Committee by its constituent parts; while the MoI, for example, appears to be highly engaged in the Committee, the MoD appears to be disengaged. There needs to be mechanism developed by which the MOD becomes engaged in this process and that might entail a joint programme for the MOD and the SSR committee on SSR in the future.

That said, the UNDP and UNAMI are not aligned on advocacy on the issue of SSR. UNAMI's Political Affairs Unit and other international political representatives have reportedly been slow to encourage including SSR in the GoI's ministerial agenda.

4.1.3. Adopting a technocratic approach to SSR

The international community has, to date, taken a technical approach to SSR, with little research carried out in parliament and amongst security sector stakeholders to identify the political space for reform, namely through establishing consensus for reform and identifying alignment between political interest, parliamentary process, and executive will. Similarly, Sharif is also pushing reform through the executive, rather than the legislature, which is likely to affect the seriousness with which the reform agenda is taken. SDC members are not engaging with the SSR process or building a consensus, and this will be a key obstacle to implementation of the plan. There is an absence of political space to push through reform. There is no “consensus position” on SSR.

4.1.4. Varied technical capacity within the Committee

The strategic planning capability varies highly between the various ministries, and this is strongly mirrored in the various ministries’ capacity to engage with reform processes through the SSR Committee. As previously mentioned, while the MoI and MoP have been well engaged in this process, the MoD and NSS have been less engaged. While some interviewees believed that this reflected varied levels of institutional interests in reform, they also believed that this reflected the MoD’s limited capacity to carry out strategic planning.

This is compounded by the Committee’s broad representation, since it broadens the skills available to committee members, but also means that many of those involved in strategic planning may not understand the security sector itself and do not have a security background, resulting in the creation of a generalised and broad-sweeping strategy focused unduly on the organigramme shape of the security structure. This is mirrored by the Plan’s broad focus to date, covering human resources, organisational structures and technical capacity.

4.2. Training Needs

While the SSR planning process was initially slow to gain momentum, as the battle for Mosul has progressed, and in view of the budgetary pressures continuing to plague the State, Ministerial interest in reform is reported to have increased, with Iraqi counterparts beginning to look at what can be done in terms of reform, and at what they can afford. This provides us with an opportune moment to capitalise on the positive shifts in political will.

In view of the Plan’s broad-sweeping nature and the complex political environment, the most realistic way to move this process forward and ensure the plan’s success is through identifying a number of administrative, organisational, (specifically defining the terms of reference of reform process), managerial and legal reforms that would improve the efficiency of the sector and to build support for the broader reform package from there. Priority should be given to those areas of the plan of quick impact and low (political and financial cost) to generate momentum behind reform.

Various stakeholders involved in this process have cautioned that areas of reform with the highest chance of success are administrative, organisational (defining terms of reference) and legal (scope), and the areas that will result in failure and undermine the plan as a whole will relate to attempts to

deal with overlapping specialisms / mandates, while recognising that the need for the latter is high, this—coupled with addressing corruption—should be carried out through the legislature.

Activity	Committee Interest	Need	Short / Mid / Long Term Priority
Understanding why other reform processes have failed to map what success would look like in Iraq	Medium	High	Short
Mapping consensus and assessing low risk changes	Medium	High	Short
Designing affordable reform processes	High	High	Short
Monitoring & Evaluating Progress	Low	Medium	Medium
Understanding and Evaluating Risk risk management methodologies	High	Medium	Short
Understanding the importance of networking in the sector and in other branches of government to build support	Medium	Medium	Short
Understanding Ministries' internal environment	High	High	Short
Building consensus positions (proactive)	Medium	High	Medium

4.3. Approach to training

SSR Committee training, which will occur before the SDC trainings, will focus on implementation plans for the SSR strategy and setting the stage to generate political consensus through the SDC training. The SSR committee needs institutional memory and expertise if it is to perform these functions effectively, and its role should be similar to expert committees that are present in other countries. There will be two core components of the training programme. The first will present a set of skills and working practices that are needed to think through and deliver SSR. The second will explore what has not worked in other contexts to encourage the committee to come up with a deliverable action plan for what will work in the context of Iraq.

The first workshops will be based on a series of skills based training sessions. These will include risk assessment and management, strategic communications and networking in government, consensus building and presenting value for money proposals with impact assessment methodologies. These will then be applied to the analysis of failure in the second set of workshops.

Core areas to be explored will include examples from other contexts that address challenges similar to those in Iraq. For example, the possible recurrence of ethnic violence (South Sudan), external imposition of reform processes (Post-Soviet), misdirected donor support and training (DRC), disconnect between state building and functional capacity building and improvements to human security, (multiple examples) and so on. The objective would be to empower the committee to think through what would work in the Iraq context by providing them with evidence of what has not worked in other contexts. The aim being in part to stress one of the central lessons of SSR that local technical and political ownership is key.

